Nietzsche and the Problem of Clericalism

Note: Please read disclaimers before reading the rest of this piece, they will clarify exactly what I want to say in this piece and more importantly what I am not saying in this piece.

Disclaimer 1: Yes, I am using Nietzsche to explore the issue of clericalism in the Roman Catholic Church. Yes, I am a Roman Catholic and actually enjoying my reading of Nietzsche. Yes, I understand Nietzsche is not Christian, matter of fact he hates Christianity (which he more than implicitly states in his Genealogy of Morality when he talks about the inversion of values and Jesus (Nietzsche 1151, Treatise 1, #8). However, this piece plans to use Nietzsche's examination of morality and examine the possibility of temptation to a clericalist attitude (this can be by both laity and clergy, which this piece will examine how this possibility comes to fruition.) I want this to be an example of inculturation, someone outside Christianity writing on human nature (tendencies may be a better word), and what can this person teach us about Christianity.

Disclaimer 2: Citations for this piece are taken from Classics of Moral and Political Theory 4th edition. Each citation will appear as the one above with a page number, a treatise number and a section number. My text of The Genealogy of Morality appears in an anthology so the page numbers will not correspond with a book by the primary author. The treatise number and section number will allow the reader to find the source quotations in a book which is not my political theory book.

Disclaimer 3: This piece is not written to implicate any particular person or diocese participating in this behavior. However, my own presupposition is that I have seen behaviors similar to the ones I will mention in this piece, so this affects the way I write and think. My hope is everyone who reads this will be able to understand my presuppositions and be able to contribute to a fruitful discussion about the nature of clericalism, its potentiality for being a problem, if the attitudes really are problematic, or if someone wants to leave a comment about how I am completely wrong that will be acceptable as well. I want this piece to be a discussion starter for the future. This piece is by no means exclusive of everything which can be discussed; there are many outlets which can pour forth from this piece. However, I only want to cover the basics in this piece so as to leave it open for discussion on the blog and on facebook. That's all the disclaimers for now, if I think of more later I'll add them.

Yay for disclaimers! Let's get to the fun part now, which is examining the content.

For starters, one must understand the concept of noble and slave morality in order to understand Nietzsche. Noble morality is morality which focuses on the virtue of being powerful and using that power to exercise control over people. A prime example of this morality is the Roman Empire. Rome valued courage and strength, the ability to face danger head-on. Military prowess was brutal and those who resisted Rome were crushed in their struggle. (Jerusalem 70 AD is an example of this brutality.) (1150, Treatise 1, #7) Slave morality is morality which has a life focus of generosity. Virtue is measured not by strength, but rather by compassion. The best example of this is Christianity itself, which is the popular bringer of value inversion (1151, Treatise 1, #8) At its base concept, this presents a power struggle between the nobles who want to have a morality based on strength, and the religious leaders who want one based on virtuous gift.

This raises two points: First, it presents an interesting discussion on Church/State dynamics. Machiavelli in The Prince issues a treatise on why rulers should appear to be virtuous, but at times not act in virtue because it serves the best needs for the people. This work is the reason why power politics has an appearance in society. If one has ever examined a politician and thought she is lying through her teeth, this is the mentality which empowers current politics. People are influenced by slave morality because they deplore the problems in the State. They deplore the use of power by the nobles over their lives. (This may not seem as obvious in a democratic country, but looking at the recent financial crisis may present this issue in a greater light. Nobles looking out for their own interests on Wall Street gambled with other people's money trying to make more money to infinity and figured out the hard way how that does not work. Slaves were upset because they are the ones suffering in unemployment lines, while nobles are still making massive amounts of money because of government bailouts.)

Nietzsche highlights this point and writes, "The truly great haters in the history of the world have always been priests, also the most ingenious haters: -compared with the spirit of priestly revenge all the rest of spirit taken together hardly merits consideration (1150, Treatise 1, #7)." This is a strong critique, but his point is that priests are heads of the ideas of slave morality. As heads of slave morality, they act in different interests than noble morality. This leads to tension between the priests and the state because there is a disagreement. For the state, this is no problem, if the priests become a problem they can crush them with only resistance from those lower than themselves. For the priests, this is a big problem because there is this constant struggle to find a place in the world. Using this mentality, it becomes easy to see how some religious circles have a great dichotomy between "the spirit of the world" and "the spirit of God."

Second, the source of value inversion had taken place in many small ways in societies before. Greek philosophers had Plato and Aristotle who were different from the state. Plato's virtue focused on finding the forms (of beauty, truth, etc) (See Plato's Republic). Aristotle's virtue focused on the Golden Mean, finding virtue in moderation (See Nicomachean Ethics). Both of these standards of virtue were different from Greek society; however, their popularity was not great among the people. Both men had schools of thinkers, but their influence on the people was not large (at least compared to what happens later) (Actually it can also be argued that Greek philosophy only survived because of its inculturation into Christianity). Jesus and his followers popularize value inversion by their consistent witness, often to their death, (see the stories of the martyrs in the patristic period, there are too many of them to list here, Acts 7 is a good story which characterizes the reality of the martyr.) This value inversion eventually becomes connected with the State by the conversion of Constantine; however, the tension always exists in some fashion between Church and State. (Benedict and his rule were written in response to the popularization of Christianity in the Roman Empire.)

Now that these two points have been made we can now explain the person of the priest using Nietzsche's criteria. The priest as a follower of Jesus is by definition a teacher of value inversion and slave morality. However, by being a priest in a position to teach slave morality, the priest is no longer a slave in the same way a lay person is. The priest gains a title of respect which makes him more noble. However, this nobility places the priest in a weird position, because he is not a noble by noble standards. But he is still a noble in the sense of a difference between people.

This circumstance comes with certain temptations. The temptation arises from the system of guilt-debt which is prevalent in slave morality (1163, Treatise 2, #4). Nietzsche uses guilt-debt to explain the connection between having guilt and having a debt toward a religious end, for example salvation of the soul. The salvation of the soul becomes collateral for certain behaviors toward others. It also becomes the source of comparison between one person and another (1166, Treatise 2, #8). This is dangerous for the priest trying to avoid clericalism because the priest has a lot of power in influencing the congregation on the matters of slave morality. Also, slave morality in some respect helps the priest have his life support, because people donate money to support the Church. The encouragement of generosity allows the priests to survive and have the material needs and luxuries they have.

If salvation of the soul becomes collateral for paying a sort of debt to God, there is a danger of losing sight of God's grace. This is where Nietzsche in his analysis is not looking necessarily at what is there, but only what he sees in physical phenomenon. However, the point useful for this analysis is that this can happen, people can feel indebted spiritually and in a sense of gift/donation to a particular priest or Church and lose this sense of a free gift of grace. Particularly in Germany, Martin Luther's memory would be particularly strong for Nietzsche in examining religion, where Luther was critiquing the "buying of grace." (particularly indulgences, which in medieval practice was pay x amount of money toward donation of building St. Peter's Basilica in Rome and one could have sins forgiven) (a bit of an oversimplification but this will suffice for now.) This presupposition may help clarify Nietzsche's position and understand his own feelings in writing what he wrote. Catholic position has a problem with indulgences in that manner of saying ("give us x money, you get sins forgiven." Confession is much more personal and focused on the self growing toward conversion toward a giving slave morality, but also not at the cost of the self completely. There is a greater understanding that there must be a self to give which Nietzsche may not have been exposed to in his own faith and time.)

The above example is a situation of oversimplifying morality either because of a belief that people cannot understand the goods of slave morality and value inversion or because there is an end which wants to be obtained by this simplification. This can happen even in modern times, even with a greater understanding of the self. The rest of this essay wants to explore a new possibility which was not a problem in Nietzsche's time, namely the increasing relations between Church and State and the blending of nobilities. (Nietzsche wrote in a time where the Modernist controversy was prevalent so there was not as much engagement between Church and State. This was a time of increasing fear of the State. This fear changed during Vatican II.)

By the blending of nobilities, I refer to the phenomenon of priests (and lay members who want to work with them) working with politicians to reach certain ends. This takes place in many ways, some which serve the common good, and others of which require us to ask questions. Many efforts take place to serve the needs of the poor, the unborn, the homeless between the two nobilities. However, there is a certain tension which exists because there are philosophies which blend the two nobilities too closely.

For example, say priests and nobles were to each compromise some of their values to make a consensus to serve some benefit. In order to popularize this consensus, priests then would need to explain this in their homilies and sermons to their congregation. People involved with the parish may see this reality and want to agree with it. However, the parishoners who see the problems with this consensus quickly get marginalized because both the secular nobles and religious nobles have power together. They quickly get left to the backs of churches and brought to the aisles, instead of being front and center like they once were. This new philosophy quickly becomes the consensus and this serves both nobilities nicely. The secular nobles can have their power, and the priests benefit both from their congregation and the nobles who are supporting their causes. This temptation is one which cannot be ignored because the temptation for one's own utility is something which is present in life all the time. Nietzsche argues, "the good itself is not true, it is seen as what benefits the people in power (1146-47, Treatise 1, #2)."

This critique of the personalistic norm (see Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, Pope John Paul II's Love and Responsibility) is one which must be addressed in discussing clericalism. Utilitarianism is an attitude which can contribute to the possibility of clericalism because people can focus on how actions benefit themselves. To act in a way one could claim a universal maxim benefits people in authority greatly (Metaphysics of Morals). However, the lesson of slave morality for the priest which is extremely important is that a priest must be a servant of the people. This means resisting the possible temptation to blend moralities of secular and religious nobles.

Nietzsche wants to argue for the secular nobility and argue for power. (1147, Treatise 1, #2) He theorizes that virtue is the "shame of human instinct (1165, Treatise 2, #7)." To fix this problem, he wants people to be unafraid of their instincts to enjoy the suffering of others (1165, Treatise 2, #6). He also saw how people in priestly position had the potential to use their position similarly as a noble uses his position, though it is power for a different end, not physical power, but a spiritual domination of people. Nietzsche's view of human nature is pessimistic, in that doing the good not only is difficult for a human, it is something a human should not do because it hurts the potential of the present (by worrying about the future, which generosity does, especially notable in environmental debates now.) (1145, Preface, #6).

Though this picture is bleak, there is hope to avoid clericalism, and to overcome these difficulties in human nature. However, a more positive view of human nature is necessary in order to accomplish this task. In being, one can have empathetic feelings without some order of morality coming from the nobles of the slave morality. Empathetic feelings are a part of being itself, because persons are raised in community. To avoid clericalism, we have to encourage these sensitivities wherever they arise, in whatever forms of healing people want to bring to others. The cleric must avoid focusing parishoners only on his own sensitivities.

Another important attitude for preventing the possibility of clericalism is realizing that priests are people too, and as such they can fall, need respect and support, but also need to not be deified. If people glamor, ooh a priest :), then the priest will suffer the temptation to think his call is better than everyone else's because everyone tells him so. Priests need to be treated just like a regular person. This means, however, also realizing their need for support because they do not get paid enough money to live on, so in generosity people should be altruistic in serving their priest.

Finally, if there is the temptation for nobilities to blend, it must be stopped at all costs. This can be nothing but destructive to the people in the end. In the former, secular and religious nobles working together can do some good like helping people. A lot of this is seen now where the two sets of nobles work together. However, in being there is also the blending of teachings which confuse what is slave and what is noble. This has happened since Constantine made Christianity the official religion of the empire and this struggle continues today. One must take care to act truly for the good of others and not to fulfill one's own desires.

The discussion on clericalism and the blending of nobilities sheds light on the greatest problem in society today, which is people being used as means to an end for some purpose. This issue needs its own treatment, but if we believe in the slave morality, of a virtue based in generosity, then using should have no possibility in Christian existence and still be called Christian. People are used in many ways: emotionally, spiritually, sexually, physically, mentally. The possibility for clericalism shows that people see this potential for use in our own morality (which Nietzsche shows in his approach). This potential has to change and systems must be built in order to ensure this does not happen.

The other can teach us the most about ourselves. Others see things in us which do not appear to our own sight. We cannot ignore the lessons presented before us, but also we must critically question interpretations, teachings, because this engagement is how traditions live and grow. (Rahner, Chalcedon: End or Beginning?) There's more I could say here but I'll leave this post for questions and the possibility of a re-treatment or an expansion in the future. I hope you enjoyed your read :)

Aristocrates